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Abstract—Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are vulnerable to
targeted training data manipulations such as poisoning attacks
and label flips. By carefully manipulating a subset of training
samples, the attacker forces the learner to compute an incorrect
decision boundary, thereby cause misclassifications. Considering
the increased importance of SVMs in engineering and life-critical
applications, we develop a novel defense algorithm that improves
resistance against such attacks. Local Intrinsic Dimensionality
(LID) is a promising metric that characterizes the outlierness of
data samples. In this work, we introduce a new approximation
of LID called K-LID that uses kernel distance in the LID cal-
culation, which allows LID to be calculated in high dimensional
transformed spaces. We introduce a weighted SVM against such
attacks using K-LID as a distinguishing characteristic that de-
emphasizes the effect of suspicious data samples on the SVM
decision boundary. Each sample is weighted on how likely its
K-LID value is from the benign K-LID distribution rather than
the attacked K-LID distribution. We then demonstrate how the
proposed defense can be applied to a distributed SVM framework
through a case study on an SDR-based surveillance system.
Experiments with benchmark data sets show that the proposed
defense reduces classification error rates substantially (10% on
average).
Index Terms—label flip attack, poisoning attack, data poison-
ing, distributed support vector machines, local intrinsic dimen-
sionality
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent works in the literature show that even though Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVMs) are able to withstand noisy
training data by design, maliciously contaminated training data
can degrade their classification performance significantly [1],
[2], [3], [4]. By carefully manipulating a subset of the training
data, the attackers aim to alter the decision boundary of the
learner in a way that significantly hinders its prediction capa-
bilities. As Figures, 1a and 1b show, adversarial manipulations
result in a significantly different decision boundary compared
to the boundary the classifier would have obtained if the data
was pristine. Increasingly, SVMs are being used in engineering
and life-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles and
smart power grids [5]. Therefore, it is critical to develop
defense mechanisms against training data manipulations (i.e.,
poisoning or flipping labels) that can subdue their effects.
Prior work in the literature uses data sanitation (i.e., filtering
out malicious data) as a defense mechanism when learning in
the presence of maliciously altered data [6]. Data sanitation
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may seem like a trivial solution for applications such as image
classification under label flipping attacks, where even human
experts can detect the flipped samples. But for large data sets
under poisoning attacks filtering attacked samples becomes
difficult. Expert filtering is also infeasible in other real-world
applications such as communication/IoT systems where the
data is high dimensional and cannot be transformed into a
form that can be easily perceived by humans. Alternatively,
embedding the defense into the optimization algorithm is a
viable option [7], [8]. However, a majority of such defenses
rely on strong assumptions about the data distribution or the
attacker.
This paper introduces a novel defense mechanism against
poisoning and label flipping attacks using Local Intrinsic
Dimensionality (LID), a metric that gives the dimension of
the subspace in the local neighborhood of each data sample.
Recent evidence suggests a connection between the adversarial
vulnerability of learning and the intrinsic dimensionality of
the data [9], [10]. Previous research has established that LID
can be used to identify the regions where adversarial samples
lie [11], [12]. LID has been applied for detecting adversarial
samples in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) [10] and as a
mechanism to reduce the effect of noisy labels for training
DNNs [13].
In this paper, we propose a novel LID estimation called K-
LID (that calculates the LID values of data samples in the
hypothesis space) that can distinguish attacked samples from
benign samples based on the characteristics of the data itself.
When data is nonlinearly transformed to a higher dimensional
space such that the data from the two classes are well
separated, K-LID values of attacked samples would become
distinguishable from K-LID values of benign samples. We then
use this distinguishing metric to develop a weighted SVM
(K-LID-SVM) that is resistant to training data manipulations.
Figure 1c shows how the proposed defense mechanism can
withstand sophisticated attacks with minimal deformations to
the decision boundary.
Finally, we assess the applicability of our defense mech-
anism to a distributed classification setting. The threat of
adversarial attacks is aggravated in distributed classification
settings as attackers have multiple potential entry points and
even if one node is compromised, the effects of the attack can
propagate through the entire detection network [14]. We then
evaluate the practical implications of the developed defense
scheme through an engineering case-study on a Software-
defined radio (SDR) based surveillance system.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We introduce a novel defense strategy to increase the at-
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2(a) SVM - no attack. (b) SVM - alfa attack. (c) K-LID-SVM - alfa attack.
Fig. 1: Results on a two dimensional synthetic dataset for an SVM with a RBF kernel (C = 1 and γ = 0.5). The decision
boundary of the SVM trained in the absence of an attack is shown on the left. The middle figure shows the decision boundary
of the SVM with no defense when a subset of labels are flipped (from blue to red) using the Adversarial Label Flip Attack
(alfa) attack. The figure on the right shows the decision boundary of the K-LID-SVM in the presence of the alfa attack. The
flipped samples are shown as green crosses and the support vectors are circled.
tack resistance of (distributed) SVMs against poisoning
attacks as well as label flipping attacks.
2) The proposed defense uses a LID-based sample weight-
ing mechanism that:
- introduces a novel approximation of LID using kernel
distances called K-LID that calculates the LID values
of data samples in the hypothesis space (i.e., a high
dimensional transformed space);
- uses the likelihood ratio of each data sample (i.e., how
many times more likely their K-LID values are from the
benign K-LID distribution than the attacked K-LID dis-
tribution) as a distinguishing factor and incorporate this
knowledge into the SVM training process as weights.
3) We show through numerical experiments conducted with
real-world data sets that our proposed approach can
increase the attack resistance of SVMs against training
time attacks by up to 10% on average.
4) We demonstrate the adaptability of the proposed defense
to distributed settings through a case study.
5) We show experimentally that a distributed SVM de-
tection system has 44% less communication overhead
compared to a centralized SVM with only a 3.07%
reduction in detection accuracy on average.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides details of previous literature relevant to this work.
Section III formally defines the problem being addressed
followed by the defense methodology in Section IV. Section V
describes the empirical analysis on several real-world datasets
followed by the results and discussion. The concluding re-
marks of Section VI conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review previous research findings
related to distributed SVMs, training time attacks and defense
mechanisms for SVMs.
A. Distributed SVMs
Distributed training of SVMs has been studied extensively
with several variants including cascade SVM, incremental
SVM, distributed parallel SVM and consensus-based SVM
used in practice [15]. The objective of these variants is to
obtain a decision function that is close to the decision function
obtained by a centralized SVM with access to all the data
points. The approach used by Alpcan and Bauckhage [16] de-
composes the centralized SVM optimization problem into a set
of convex subproblems (one per node) with the nodes having
to exchange their respective support vectors (SVs) among each
other through a fusion center at each iteration of training. A
similar decomposed approach is proposed by Forero et al. [17]
for linear SVMs, but instead of exchanging SVs, consensus
constraints are added to the classifier parameters.
The latter consensus-based DSVM is used in a series of
works by Zhang and Zhu [14] that aim to design defense
strategies for DSVMs against adversaries. The authors use a
game-theoretic framework to capture the conflicting interests
between the consensus-based DSVM learner and the attacker.
Their proposed rejection-based defense strategy prevents up-
dates to the learning models if the primal and dual variables
change significantly after training with new data. Their pro-
posed defense model assumes that the initial data it is given
is clean and as the primal variables are used in the rejection
criteria, this model cannot be used in conjunction with RBF
kernels.
B. SVMs in the Presence of Label Flipping Attacks
Most works in the literature are concerned with stochastic
label noise, rather than malicious attacks. The problem of
classification in the presence of label noise has inspired a wide
range of research from the machine learning community, see
the work of Fre´nay and Verleysen [18] for a survey. Biggio
et al. [19] provide a security evaluation of SVMs under both
types of training time attacks. Several prior works have shown
that SVMs are significantly impacted by mislabeled instances
and removing such samples reduces the complexity of SVMs
[20]. In the work of Libralon et al. [21], the authors show that
removing flipped samples from training data results in SVMs
with simpler decision boundaries.
3Zhang and Yang [22] show that the performance of linear
SVMs degrades significantly at merely 5% of flipped labels.
Risk minimization under a particular loss function is said to
be label noise-robust if the probability of misclassification
of inferred models with label noise is identical to the same
probability without label noise. Manwani and Sastry [23]
show that hinge loss is not robust to uniform label noise,
consequently, it leads to the conclusion that SVMs are not
robust to uniform label noise.
In order to embed a mechanism to consider possible label
alterations into SVMs, An and Liang [24] use fuzzy mem-
berships for each training data point to force data points to
influence differently when calculating the separating hyper-
plane. In the work of Natarajan et al. [25], the authors suggest
two approaches to modify loss functions to withstand random
label noise during training. Liu and Tao [26] use traditional
loss functions for classification tasks in the presence of random
label noise by using importance reweighting.
Suykens and Vandewalle [7] introduce Least-Squares SVM
(LS-SVM) where a quadratic loss function is used instead of
the hinge loss, which results in a non-sparse solution to the
optimization problem (all the training samples are assigned
non-zero α values). The authors claim this approach prevents
the SVM from over-relying on the contribution of certain
samples. Label Noise Robust SVM (LN-SVM), proposed by
Biggio et al. [8], assumes that the label of each training sample
can be independently flipped with the same probability of µ.
The probability of label flips is then incorporated into the
kernel matrix. With this approach, each training sample is
more likely to become a support vector.
C. SVMs under Poisoning Attacks
Dalvi et al. [2] modeled classification as a game between
the classifier and the adversary. They extend the naive Bayes
classifier to optimally detect and reclassify perturbed data
points, by taking into account the adversary’s optimal feature-
changing strategy. Zhou et al. [27] introduced an Adversarial
SVM (AD-SVM) model which incorporated additional con-
straint conditions to the binary SVM optimization problem
to thwart an adversary’s poisoning attacks. Their model only
supports data that is linearly separable and leads to unsatis-
factory results when the severity of actual attacks differs from
the expected attack severity by the model.
One approach for learning in the presence of poisoned
training data is to identify and remove such samples prior
to training. Steinhardt et al. [6] introduced a framework that
uses an outlier detector before training in order to filter out
poisoned data. They consider two scenarios, (i) where there is
a clean outlier detector (trained independently without being
affected by the poisoned data), and (ii) where the outlier
detector is also compromised. While the framework performs
well in the first scenario, the authors claim that the attacker
can subvert the outlier removal and obtain stronger attacks in
the second scenario. Laishram and Phoha [28] introduced an
algorithm that clusters the data in the input space and utilizes
the distances among data points in the same cluster in the
(input feature + label) space to identify the outliers. These
works can be considered as a pre-processing step and could
be used in conjunction with our proposed defense mechanism
to further increase the attack resistance of SVMs.
In this work, we focus on both types of training time
attacks (i.e., poisoning and label flipping) against SVMs and
introduce one defense algorithm that can withstand both types
of attacks. To the best of our knowledge, no existing work
has explored the use of LID for defense against training time
attacks on SVMs. In addition, the impact of adversarial data
manipulations on distributed learners is understudied.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We consider an adversarial learning problem in the presence
of a malicious adversary. The adversary’s goal is to corrupt
the classification model generated in the training phase to
maximize the classification error of the detection system. This
type of attack is referred to as a poisoning availability attack
in the adversarial learning literature where the adversary’s
goal is to affect the prediction results indiscriminately, without
seeking specific mispredictions. Take S := (X, y) to be the
labeled training data where X ∈ Rn×d and yi ∈ {±1} for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To achieve its goal, the adversary either
flips a fraction of training labels (S˜ := (X, y˜)) or perturbs
the features of a fraction of data samples (S˜ := (X˜, y)).
When the learner trains on the contaminated data, it obtains a
distorted decision boundary that is significantly different from
the decision boundary it would have obtained if the data was
pristine.
In the following section, we introduce the different attack
strategies an adversary may use against an SVM. In Section
IV, we introduce our novel LID based defense models for
SVMs against such training time attacks. Refer to Section V
for details of the experimental setup (i.e., simulation, feature
selection and datasets) and empirical evidence proving the
effectiveness of the proposed defense.
A. Attack Models
1) Label Flipping Attacks: Through a series of works, Xiao
et al. [29], [8] introduced several attack models that carefully
select a subset of training labels to be flipped in order to
maximize an SVM’s classification error. The attack models
assume that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the attacked
system (white-box attack). This means that the attacker is
aware of the SVM parameters C and γ and training data
S := (X, y). While the attacker’s ability is over-estimated,
it can be considered as a worst-case scenario for the defender.
Moreover, relying on secrecy for security is considered as a
poor practice when designing attack resilient learners [19].
The attack forces the learner to erroneously shift the deci-
sion boundary such that there is a significant deviation from an
SVM trained on a non-flipped dataset. The attacker is restricted
such that it is only allowed to flip the labels of the training data
and only a maximum of L label flips are allowed. L bounds
the attacker’s capability and is fixed a priori. The main attack
strategies we test against are:
• Adversarial Label Flip Attack (alfa): take y˜ to be
the contaminated training labels. The attack model can
4be considered as a search problem for y˜ that achieves
the maximum difference between the empirical risk for
classifiers trained on y˜ and y.
• ALFA based on Hyperplane Tilting (alfa-tilt): in this
attack, the tilt in the separating margin before and after
distorting the dataset is used as a surrogate to select the
optimal label flips instead of classification error in alfa.
• Farfirst: samples that are furthest from the separating
margin of the non-flipped SVM are flipped.
• Nearest: samples that are nearest to the separating margin
of the non-flipped SVM are flipped.
• Random: a subset of samples are randomly selected from
the training data and flipped.
2) Poisoning Attacks: For binary SVMs, Biggio et al. [3]
introduced the poisoning attack algorithm (PA) that perturbs
data points in feature space such that there is a maximal
increase in the classification error. The authors assume that
the attacker has perfect information, resulting in a worst-case
analysis for the defenders. The authors address the problem of
finding the best attack points by formulating an optimization
problem that maximizes the learner’s validation error. They
empirically demonstrate that the gradient ascent algorithm
can identify local maxima of the non-convex validation error
function. The main highlight of this work is that it can identify
attack points in transformed spaces (using kernel methods).
In contrast, the restrained attack (RA) introduced by Zhou
et al. [27] conducts attacks in input space. For each malicious
data point xi the adversary aims to alter, it picks a innocuous
target xti and perturbs xi towards x
t
i. The amount of movement
is controlled by two parameters, the discount factor (Cξ) and
the attack severity (fattack).
Li et al.[30] introduced the Coordinate Greedy (CG) attack
which is modeled as an optimization problem. The objective
of the attacker is to make the perturbed data points appear
as benign as possible to the classifier while minimizing the
modification cost. For each malicious data point xi, the
attacker iteratively chooses a feature and greedily updates it
to incrementally improve the attacker’s utility.
IV. DEFENSE MODEL FOR SVMS
We now present the inner workings of our novel LID
based defense algorithm for SVMs. The defense algorithm
we propose consists of several components. First, the LID
values of all the data samples are calculated using a novel
LID approximation (K-LID). Then, for each data sample, we
calculate how many times more likely its K-LID value is from
the K-LID distribution of benign samples than the K-LID
distribution of attacked samples, i.e., likelihood ratio (LR).
Subsequently, we fit a smooth function to the LR values to
be able to predict the LRs for unseen K-LID values. Finally,
during SVM training, we weight each sample by the LR
function value corresponding to its K-LID value.
First, in Section IV-A, we present how SVMs can be
distributed among multiple compute nodes by building upon
an existing DSVM framework [16]. Then, we briefly introduce
the theory of LID for assessing the dimensionality of data
subspaces. Subsequently, in Section IV-B we describe in detail
each of the novel components of our defense algorithm.
A. Background
1) Distributed Weighted SVMs: In SVMs, in order to pe-
nalize large slack values (i.e., ξi), a regularization constant
C was introduced to the optimization problem. C penalizes
all training samples equally. In order to selectively penalize
samples, we introduce a weight βi for each sample [31]. A
small βi value would allow for a large ξi value and the effect
of the sample would be de-emphasized. Conversely, a large
βi value would force ξi to be smaller and therefore the effect
of the particular sample would be emphasized. The weighted
SVM learning can be formulated as the following convex
quadratic programming problem:
minimize
w,ξi,b
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
n∑
i=1
βiξi
subject to yi(〈 w,Φ(xi) + b)〉 ≥ 1− ξi, i = 1, . . . , n
ξi ≥ 0. i = 1, . . . , n
(1)
Then the dual formulation of the problem take the form:
maximize
α
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjk(xi, xj)
subject to 0 ≤ αi ≤ Cβi, i = 1, . . . , n
n∑
i=1
αiyi = 0.
(2)
In order to decompose the centralized SVM classifica-
tion problem into sub problems, define a set of M :=
{1, 2, . . . ,M} distributed compute units with access to dif-
ferent subsets, Si, i ∈ M, of the labeled training data such
that S =
⋃M
i=1 Si. Given this partition, define the vectors
{α(1), α(2), . . . , α(M)} with the ith vector having a size of
Ni. In order to devise a distributed algorithm, the SVM
optimization problem is relaxed by substituting the constraint∑n
i=1 αiyi = 0 by a penalty function 0.5MZ(
∑n
i=1 αiyi),
where Z > 0. Thus, the following constrained optimization
problem is obtained:
maximize
α
F (α) =
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjk(xi, xj)
− MZ
2
( n∑
l=1
αlyl
)
subject to 0 ≤ αi ≤ Cβi, i = 1, . . . , n
(3)
Note that the objective function F (α) is strictly concave in all
its arguments and the constraint set is convex, compact and
nonempty.
The convex optimization problem defined in (3) is next par-
titioned into M sub-problems through Lagrangian decomposi-
tion. Therefore, the eth unit’s optimization problem becomes
maximize
α
(e)
i ∈[0,Cβi]
Fe(α) =
∑
i∈Se
αi − 1
2
∑
i∈Se
n∑
j=1
αiαjyiyjk(xi, xj)
− MZ
2
(∑
i∈Se
αiyi
)
.
(4)
5The individual optimization problems of the units are in-
terdependent. Therefore, they cannot be solved individually
without exchanging information between all the processing
units. We use a fusion center that collects and distributes
support vectors (SVs) among the individual processing units
similar to the work of Alpcan and Bauckhage [16].
2) Theory of Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID): LID is
an expansion-based measure of the intrinsic dimensionality
of the underlying data subspace [11]. Expansion models of
dimensionality have previously been successfully employed
in a wide range of applications, such as manifold learning,
dimension reduction, similarity search and anomaly detection
[11], [32]. In this paper, we use LID to characterize the intrin-
sic dimensionality of regions where attacked samples lie and
create a weighting mechanism that de-emphasizes the effect
of samples that have a high likelihood of being adversarial
examples. Refer to [11] for more details concerning the theory
of LID. The formal definition of LID [11] is given below.
Definition 1 (Local Intrinsic Dimensionality).
Given a data sample x ∈ X , let R > 0 be a random variable
denoting the distance from x to other data samples. If the
cumulative distribution function F (r) of R is positive and
continuously differentiable at distance r > 0, the LID of x
at distance r is given by:
LIDF (r) , lim→0
ln
(
F ((1 + ) · r)/F (r))
ln(1 + )
=
r · F ′(r)
F (r)
, (5)
whenever the limit exists.
The last equality of (5) follows by applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule
to the limits [11]. The local intrinsic dimension at x is in turn
defined as the limit, when the radius r tends to zero:
LIDF = limr→0 LIDF (r). (6)
LIDF describes the relative rate at which its cumulative
distribution function F (r) increases as the distance r increases
from 0. In the ideal case where the data in the vicinity of
x is distributed uniformly within a subspace, LIDF equals
the dimension of the subspace; however, in practice these
distributions are not ideal, the manifold model of data does
not perfectly apply and LIDF is not an integer [10]. Never-
theless, the local intrinsic dimensionality is an indicator of the
dimension of the subspace containing x that would best fit the
data distribution in the vicinity of x.
3) Estimation of LID: Given a reference sample x ∼ P ,
where P represents the data distribution, the Maximum Like-
lihood Estimator of the LID at x is defined as follows [32]:
L̂ID(x) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ri(x)
rmax(x)
)−1
. (7)
Here, ri(x) denotes the distance between x and its i-th
nearest neighbor within a sample of k points drawn from
P and rmax(x) is the maximum of the neighbor distances.
The above estimation assumes that samples are drawn from a
tight neighborhood, in line with its development from Extreme
Value Theory. In practice, the sample set is drawn uniformly
from the available training data (omitting x itself), which itself
is presumed to have been randomly drawn from P . Note that
the LID defined in (6) is the theoretical calculation and that
L̂ID defined in (7) is its estimate.
When the training data X is large, computing neighbor-
hoods with respect to the entire dataset X can be prohibitively
expensive. The LID value of a sample x can be estimated from
its k-nearest neighbor set within a randomly-selected sample
(mini-batch sampling) of the dataset X [10]. Given that the
mini-batch is chosen to be sufficiently large so as to ensure
that the k-nearest neighbor sets remain in the vicinity of x,
estimates of LID computed for x within the mini-batch would
resemble those computed within the full dataset X . Therefore,
in order to reduce the computational cost, we use mini-batch
sampling in our experiments.
B. Kernel LID (K-LID)
The section below describes the novel LID approximation
that we introduce followed by the procedure used to obtain
the sample weights βi.
1) Calculating LID w.r.t. labels: As explained earlier in
Section IV-A2, LID is usually concerned with the data X and
is independent of the corresponding labels y. Since only the
labels are maliciously flipped in a label flipping attack, the
LID values of X , before and after the attack would remain
the same. Therefore, we devise three label dependent LID
variations as follows.
Take S := (X, y) to be the full training data set with labels.
Then, define Sj := (Xj , yj), where j = {±1} as the set of
data samples that carry the same label j.
• In-class LID: For each xl ∈ Xj , the LID is calculated
w.r.t. xh6=l ∈ Xj , for j = {±1}. In-class LID of a
particular sample gives the dimension of the subspace
w.r.t. the data distribution of the same class.
• Out-class LID: For each xl ∈ Xj the LID is calculated
w.r.t. {xh ∈ X | xh /∈ Xj}, for j = {±1}. Out-class
LID gives the dimension of the subspace in which a
particular sample lies w.r.t. the data distribution of the
opposite class.
• Cross-class LID: Define cross-class LID as the ratio
between the in-class LID and the out-class LID.
In our experiments we use cross-class LID to highlight sam-
ples that likely to be adversarial samples.
2) Kernel LID calculation: For the above label dependent
LID variations to give distinguishable LID distributions for
attacked and benign samples, the data clouds from the two
classes need to be physically separated. LID in its original
form is calculated using the Euclidean distance (although
the underlying distance measure does not necessarily have
to be Euclidean [10]) between samples in the input space
x ∈ Rd. As non-linearly separable datasets have data from
both classes inter-weaved, the aforementioned LID values of
attacked samples and benign samples would have overlapping
distributions.
To have two distinguishable LID distributions for attacked
and benign samples, X needs to be non-linearly transformed to
a high dimensional space where the data from two classes are
well separated. This approach is similar to the SVM training
procedure, where the data is transformed to higher dimensional
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Fig. 2: The probability density functions and the corresponding
weight distributions when different γ values are used in the
K-LID calculation.
spaces where the data becomes linearly separable. In SVMs,
instead of explicitly transforming data to the high dimensional
space and calculating the dot product between samples, the
kernel trick is used to implicitly obtain the dot products (i.e.,
k(x, x′) = 〈Φ(x), Φ(x′)〉). While it is feasible when using
certain kernels to obtain the transformed Φ(x) values, for
kernels such as the radial basis function kernel (RBF) it is
not possible and only the dot product can be obtained. Thus,
calculating the LID in the hypothesis space using Euclidean
distance is not possible.
The RBF kernel function non-linearly transforms the
squared Euclidean distance between two data points x and
x′ as K(x, x′) = exp(−γ‖x − x′‖2) in order to obtain the
corresponding kernel matrix entry. The RBF kernel function
returns 1 for identical data points and 0 for dissimilar data
points. As the theory of LID computes similarity using a
distance function (7), we use the reciprocal of the kernel value
and propose the following variation of LID called Kernel LID
(K-LID).
K̂-LID(x) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ti(x)
tmax(x)
)−1
. (8)
Here, ti(x) denotes the distance between x and its i-th nearest
neighbor calculated as ti(x) = (1/K(x, xi))− 1 and tmax(x)
denotes the maximum distance among the neighbor sample
points. In the remainder of this paper, we will use (8) to
estimate K-LID values.
The following theorem shows the relationship between K-
LID values and LID values calculated using Euclidean distance
in the input space. Define ∆ as a Euclidean distance measure.
Then, following the above transformation of distance, t can
be written as t = 1
exp(−γ∆2)
− 1.
Theorem 1: The LID calculated using Euclidean distance
in input space (i.e., LID∆) is proportional to the K-LID
calculated using transformed distances (i.e., K-LIDt) as,
LID∆ =
2γ∆2 exp(γ∆
2)
exp(γ∆2)−1 × K-LIDt. (9)
Proof: The proof immediately follows from Theorem 3 of
[33].
C. K-LID Distributions of Attacked and Pristine Samples
We discuss here the intuition behind using K-LID to identify
adversarial samples during training. Flipping the label of a
data sample would give it a different class assignment from
most of its close neighbors. Computing K-LID estimates
with respect to its neighborhood from within those samples
that share the same class assignment (i.e., In-class K-LID)
would then reveal an anomalous distribution of the local
distance to these neighbors. Similarly, the out-class K-LID
(K-LID calculated w.r.t. samples that have the opposite class
assignment) would also give different distributions for flipped
and non-flipped samples. Consequently, the Cross-class K-
LID, which combines the distinguishing powers of In-class K-
LID and Out-class K-LID, would have the power to distinguish
flipped samples from non-flipped samples.
Under poisoning attacks, the perturbed samples would be
in close proximity to other data samples that share the same
class assignment, yet not embedded within the benign data
distribution. Therefore, perturbed samples would have an
anomalous distribution of the local distance to these neighbors
and would be highlighted by their cross-class K-LID values.
To build an SVM classifier resilient against adversarial
attacks, we require the K-LID estimates of benign samples
and attacked samples to have distinguishing distributions. In
a black-box system, the two distributions can be obtained
by simulating an attack and deliberately altering a subset
of labels/data during training, by assuming the distributions
based on domain knowledge or prior experience related to the
specific application or by having an expert identify attacked
and benign samples in a subset of the dataset.
Through our experiments, we aim to demonstrate the dis-
tinguishing capability of the novel K-LID that we introduced.
To that end, we use the following grey-box system to obtain
the K-LID distributions of attacked and benign samples while
restating it can be converted to a black-box system by using
any of the aforementioned procedures. Note that the learner
does not need to be aware of the type of attack being used,
it only needs the K-LID distributions of attacked and benign
samples.
First, to identify a suitable hypothesis space that separates
the data of two classes, the learner performs an exhaustive
search for the ideal RBF gamma parameter (γ∗) by calculating
the cross-class K-LID values for the training dataset under
different γ∗ values. Note that this γ∗ is used for obtaining K-
LID values and is independent of the SVM training process.
The learner estimates the density functions of K-LID estimates
for benign samples and attacked samples of each class under
each γ∗ value using kernel density estimation methods [34].
Subsequently, the learner uses the Kullback-Leibler divergence
(or colloquially KL distance) between the K-LID densities of
benign and attacked samples as the measure of goodness of
each transformation and selects the γ∗ value that yields the
highest KL distance. The Kullback-Leibler divergence calcu-
lates the statistical distance between two probability distribu-
tions P and Q as DKL(P ||Q) =
∑
i P (i) log(P (i)/Q(i)).
As Figure 2a shows, K-LID is a powerful metric that can
give two distinguishable distributions for attacked and benign
7samples. Although, ideally we like to see no overlap between
the two distributions, in real-world datasets we see some
percentage of overlap. Figure 2b shows the weight assignment
function which gives weights to samples based on their K-
LID values. In the following section, we explain how the
weight assignment function is derived from the two K-LID
distributions shown in Figure 2a.
1) Sample Weighting Scheme: Define pjn and p
j
f as the
probability density functions of the K-LID values of benign
samples and attacked samples, respectively, for the two classes
j = {±1}. We assume there are two possible hypotheses, Hjn
and Hjf . For a given data sample x
′ with the K-LID estimate
K-LID(x′). We may write the two hypotheses for j = {±1}
as
Hjn : K-LID(x
′) ∼ pjn,
Hjf : K-LID(x
′) ∼ pjf ,
(10)
where the notation “K-LID(x′) ∼ p” denotes the condition
“K-LID(x′) is from the distribution p”. To clarify, Hjn is the
hypothesis that K-LID(x′) is from the distribution pjn and
Hjf is the hypothesis that K-LID(x
′) is from the distribution
pjf . The likelihood ratio (LR) is usually used in statistics to
compare the goodness of fit of two statistical models. For
example, the likelihood ratio of a data sample x′ with the
K-LID estimate K-LID(x′) is defined as
Λj(K-LID(x′)) = pjn
(
K-LID(x′)
)
/pjf
(
K-LID(x′)
)
. (11)
p(K-LID(x′)) denotes the probability value corresponding to
the K-LID of sample x from the probability distribution p. To
clarify, Λj(K-LID(x′)) expresses how many times more likely
it is that K-LID(x’) is under the K-LID distribution of benign
samples than the K-LID distribution of attacked samples. As
the likelihood ratio value is unbounded above, we clip the LR
values of all the samples at some dataset dependent threshold
after obtaining the LR values for the entire dataset.
As there is a high possibility for pjn and p
j
f to have an
overlapping region, there is a risk of overemphasizing (giving
a higher weight to) attacked samples. To mitigate that risk, we
only de-emphasize samples that are suspected to be attacked
(i.e., low LR values). Therefore, we transform the LR values
such that Λj(K-LID(x)) ∈ (0.1, 1) for j = {±1}. We set the
lower bound for the weights to an arbitrary value close to 0
(0.1 in this case) as the weighted SVM would simply disregard
any training points that carry the weight 0. The upper bound
is set to 1 to prevent overemphasizing samples. Subsequently,
we fit a hyperbolic tangent function to the transformed LR
values in the form of 0.55− 0.45× tanh(az − b) and obtain
suitable values for the parameters a and b. The scalar values
0.45 and 0.55 maintain the scale and vertical position of the
function between 0.1 and 1. Finally, we use the K-LID value
of each xi and use (12) to obtain the corresponding weight
βi.
βi = 0.55− 0.45× tanh(aK-LID(xi)− b). (12)
The high level procedure used to construct the K-LID-SVM
under a label flipping attack is formalized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 K-LID-SVM Defense Algorithm
1: input S˜ = (X, y˜) . contaminated training data
2: output SVM weights β
3: for j = {+1,−1} do . for each class
4: initialize K-LIDf ,K-LIDn,Λj , βj
5: γ∗ ← search for gamma that best separates the two classes
6: K-LIDf ← k-lid-calc(X, y˜, γ∗) . k-lid of flipped data
7: K-LIDn ← k-lid-calc(X, y˜, γ∗) . k-lid of non-flipped data
8: Λj ← calculate likelihood ratio for each K-LID value
9: fit function g(z) = 0.55− 0.45× tanh(az − b) to Λj
10: βj ← g(K-LIDX) . obtain weight of xi ∈ X with y˜i = j
using the K-LID of x
11: end for
12: β ← β+1 and β−1
13: K-LID-SVM = train classifier using(X, y˜, β)
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The following section describes how the datasets are ob-
tained, pre-processed and other procedures of the experimental
setup. Our objective is to extensively investigate how the per-
formance of K-LID-SVM holds against an increasing fraction
of attacked training data, for each of the proposed attacks
described in Section III. To achieve these objectives we use
several real-world categorical datasets as well as network
simulation data. Our code is available at https://github.com/
sandamal/lid-svm.
A. Experimental Setup
CRN_simulation
visualizerconfiguratorrad oMediumfigureHelpe
hostA[0]
hostA[1]
hostA[2]
hostA[3]
hostA[4]
hostL[0]
hostL[1] hostL[2]
hostL[3]
hostC[0]
hostC[1]
hostC[2] hostC[3]
hostC[4]
General: Two hosts communicating wirelessly
Fig. 3: A representation of the SDR listeners (blue), civilians
(green) and malicious sources (red) in OMNeT++ simulator.
1) Case Study: Identifying Malicious Transmission Sources:
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of
literature on machine learning and decision making on wireless
networks [35], [36]. What follows is an experimental evalu-
ation of the developed defense scheme (using DSVM) in the
context of a Software-defined radio (SDR) based surveillance
system. SDRs with computing capabilities can serve as a low-
cost scanner array that uses a distributed SVM to identify
malicious transmission sources from background radio traffic
in an area (Figure 3). Due to the prevalence of encryption
methods, identification of the transmission sources has to be
based on their statistical characteristics. For a network with a
large number of SDR listeners, a distributed classifier is the
obvious choice due to being scalable and efficient as it requires
less communication overhead.
8To obtain data, we use the INET framework for OMNeT++
[37] to simulate the actions of the transmitters, receivers and
listeners (OMNeT simulation data available at https://github.
com/sandamal/omnet simulation). During the initial stage of
system deployment, the SDR nodes collect data to train the
classification models. Subsequently, during the operational
stage, the SDR nodes would use the learned models to identify
new transmission sources in the area. During the data collec-
tion phase and an attacker could gain access to one or more of
the listener nodes to carry out a label flipping attack. This may
happen through the use of malware or unauthorized access.
For poisoning attacks, however, the attack can be carried out
by altering the communication parameters of the malicious
transmission sources.
For more realistic simulation, we consider signal attenua-
tion, signal interference, background noise and limited radio
ranges. The nodes (civilians, malicious sources and listeners)
are placed randomly within the given confined area. Due to the
random placement, some transmission nodes can be outside the
listening range of any of the listeners. It is also possible for
several transmission sources to be placed in close proximity,
thereby creating signal interference. However, this is reflective
of a real-world scenario where it is not possible to know
beforehand where the transmission sources are positioned in
a given area.
The simulator allows control of the frequencies and bit rates
of the transmitter radios, their communication ranges, interfer-
ence ranges, message sending intervals, message lengths, the
sensitivity of the receivers and minimum energy detection of
receivers among other parameters. Note that for simplicity, we
assume that the listener nodes are wideband receivers, which
allows them to capture data on all possible channels. However,
transmission sources have fixed channels. We assume that all
nodes communicate securely, therefore the listeners are unable
to access the content of the captured messages. Following the
simulations, we extract the following features from the data
received by the listener nodes to classify transmission sources
(as a civilian or a malicious source):
• Duration of reception
• Message length
• Inter arrival time (IAT)
• Carrier frequency
• Bandwidth
• Bitrate
The duration, message length and IAT of the messages
received by the listener during an hour is averaged every five
minutes, which results in 36 (12×3) features in total. Adding
the latter three features (fixed for each transmission source)
gives the full feature vector of 39 features. The collected data
is then fed to an attack algorithm. We consider a cellular-like
architecture with M = 5 listening nodes per region. Therefore
the attacked data is then randomly divided among the listener
nodes. Due to the random division of attacked training data,
there is a high probability for all the compute nodes to be
affected by the attack. Therefore, our approach considers the
worst-case scenario for the learning system.
2) Benchmark Datasets: We also evaluate the effectiveness
of K-LID-SVM on four real-world datasets used in [29]:
TABLE I: Datasets used for training and testing.
Dataset Training size Test size C γ
MNIST 1,500 500 1.47 0.0197
Acoustic 500 500 1,024 0.0078
Ijcnn1 500 500 64 0.1200
Seismic 500 500 1,024 0.0078
Splice 500 500 1,024 0.0078
OMNeT 364 91 0.3969 0.7937
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Fig. 4: The classification performance of centralized K-LID-
SVM and distributed K-LID-SVM and the amount of data
exchanged in each case.
Acoustic, Ijcnn1, Seismic and Splice as well as MNIST. Note
that the high computational complexities of the attacks make
it infeasible to be performed on larger datasets. We report
the performance of K-LID-SVM using the error rate (i.e.,
percentage of samples wrongly classified) on a separate test
set, using 5-fold cross-validation. The average error rates are
reported as the attack rate is increased from 0% to 30%. Table
I gives the chosen parameters and the number of samples used
in each training and test set.
For each dataset, we compute the SVM hyper-parameters
(i.e., C and γ) using a 5-fold cross-validation process. Kernel
density estimation was performed using a Gaussian kernel with
bandwidth set using a cross-validation approach. The effects
of kernel density estimation and clipping of the LR values at
a heuristic threshold are neutralized by the smooth function
fitting (12), therefore the algorithm is robust to these choices.
For K-LID calculations, we tune k over the range [10, 100)
for a mini-batch size of 100, following Ma et al. [10].
B. Results
1) Distributed detection vs. centralized detection: First, we
compare the performance of a DSVM against the performance
of a centralized SVM in the SDR based surveillance system.
As SDRs have limited power and range, each SDR captures
only the transmissions of nodes within its range. The objective
of the cognitive network is for each SDR to have the ability
to classify a new transmission source x as a malicious source
or a civilian in a distributed manner without communicating
x itself to the other nodes. But to obtain a classifier that
can identify all the types of transmitters in the given area,
the information obtained by each listener would need to
9be communicated to all the other SDR listeners during the
training phase. This can be achieved in one of two ways: (i)
have a fusion center collect all the data from the listeners and
train one classification model and transfer the learned model
back to the listeners (i.e., centralized solution), or (ii) have the
listener SDRs (which have computing capabilities) compute
classification models based on their local data, exchange the
learned models with other listeners through one or more
fusion centers followed by an update to their local models.
For simplicity, we only consider the data exchange between
the SDRs and the fusion centers (i.e., can be modeled as a
distributed SVM with one fusion center). While having more
than one fusion center improves the robustness of the overall
system, it would increase the communication overhead due to
the information exchange between the fusion centers.
Figure 4a shows the error rates on the test set when
malicious sources carry out alfa attacks on the distributed SDR
listeners with the flip rate increasing from 0% to 30%. We
observe that the centralized SVM solution has lower error rates
compared to the DSVM solution on average. We postulate that
this is due to two main reasons, (i) the optimization problem
used by the DSVM (3) is a relaxation of the optimization
problem of the centralized SVM (2), and (ii) as shown by
Amsaleg et al. [32], the MLE estimator of LID (7) is not
stable on small mini-batch sizes. In the DSVM setting, each
SVM node trains on the data that it receives from civilians
and malicious sources within its listening range, resulting in
smaller dataset sizes. Therefore, the resulting LID estimations
would also be affected compared to the centralized learner.
Although the detection capability of the DSVM is less than
the centralized SVM, we observe that its information exchange
overhead is significantly less compared to the centralized SVM
in this particular scenario. Figure 4b shows the number of data
points exchanged at each flip rate for the two SVM solutions.
In our experiment, we consider M = 5 listeners, therefore in
the centralized SVM, the listeners would first transfer their
data points to the central SVM and the SVM would transfer
the SVs back to all five nodes after the SVM training process.
Afterward, each node would be able to evaluate new data
samples using the received SVs (note that for simplicity we
are not considering the overhead of transmitting the α values).
In the DSVM, each SVM node would use a random vector
of α values to initialize the training process. Subsequently,
after each training iteration, they would transfer their SVs to
a central fusion node, which would distribute them among the
other SVM nodes. Note that the DSVM iteratively trains only
until the detection accuracy converges.
As Figure 4b shows, the DSVM can reduce the information
exchange overhead by 44.4% on average with only a 3.07%
reduction in average detection accuracy. These findings sug-
gest that detection using a DSVM solution is indeed the better
option for the SDR based detection network.
2) Performance of K-LID vs. LID: Figure 5 depicts the
classification performance of K-LID-SVM vs. conventional
LID-SVM. As expected, K-LID-SVM has lower error rates
on average. If data from the two classes are not linearly
separable in the input space, conventional LID fails to give two
distinguishable distributions with a low percentage of overlap.
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Fig. 5: The classification performance of LID-SVM and K-
LID-SVM on two datasets.
When the percentage of overlap is high, the defense algorithm
assigns a low, uniform weight to almost all samples. Such a
weight assignment would make the LID-SVM equivalent to an
SVM with no defense (with a sub-optimal C value). Therefore,
as seen in Figure 5a, LID-SVM could perform worse than an
SVM with no defense in some data sets. However, K-LID,
which performs the LID calculation in higher dimensional
transformed spaces where the data is separated, has sufficient
separation power to obtain two distinguishable distributions
with a low percentage of overlap.
When using the kernel-based distance function, if the γ used
is large, two data points are considered similar only if they
are close to each other in the transformed space, conversely,
if γ is small, even data points that are farther away from
each other in the transformed space are considered similar.
Therefore different γ values give distinct K-LID distributions
with different percentages of overlap. When there is a high
percentage of overlap it is not possible to obtain meaningful
weights.
3) K-LID Distributions at High Attack Rates: Having a flip
rate of 30% assumes a very powerful attacker with significant
influence. At high flip rates, the two distributions have a high
overlap percentage and the likelihood ratio cannot be used to
distinguish flipped samples from non-flipped ones, therefore
the learner assigns a low, uniform weight to most samples.
We believe that this increase in overlap percentage is the
main reason why K-LID-SVM tends to have relatively higher
error rates when the flip rate is 30%. As explained in Section
IV-B, we estimate K-LID using mini-batch sampling. For a
flipped sample xi, we speculate that at a flip rate of 30%,
the probability of having other flipped samples within the
randomly-selected subset increases and the K-LID calculation
is influenced by other flipped samples that carry the same label
yi. A comprehensive investigation of the trade-offs among
mini-batch size, K-LID estimation accuracy and detection
performance is an interesting direction for future work.
4) Under Label Flipping Attacks: We compare the perfor-
mance of K-LID-SVM against LS-SVM [7] and LN-SVM [8]
which have been shown to be effective against label flipping
attacks (see Section II). Table II gives the error rate of each
defense mechanism averaged over all the flip rates considered
(0% - 30%). Due to space limitations, graphs of only some
experiments are shown.
Random label flips: The performance of the binary SVM
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Fig. 6: The average error rates of SVM, K-LID-SVM, LS-SVM and LN-SVM (µ = 0.15) against random label flip attacks on
MNIST, Ijcnn1 and OMNeT when the training flip rate increases from 0% to 30%.
TABLE II: Average error rates across all the flip rates of each
defense algorithm against the five attacks considered. The best
results are indicated in bold font.
Dataset SVM K-LID-SVM LS-SVM LN-SVM
ra
nd
om
MNIST 0.64 0.62 12.83 5.17
Acoustic 27.80 26.35 28.14 28.58
Ijcnn1 16.79 15.51 16.36 19.60
Seismic 25.45 24.79 23.21 36.97
Splice 24.77 20.28 24.07 30.42
OMNeT 29.19 24.10 27.85 31.08
fa
rfi
rs
t
MNIST 12.93 3.08 16.72 18.54
Acoustic 39.22 35.01 39.96 42.14
Ijcnn1 34.42 29.91 22.49 38.21
Seismic 33.16 31.20 31.48 35.00
Splice 31.60 28.29 31.10 33.21
OMNeT 36.75 32.10 26.18 34.88
ne
ar
es
t
MNIST 6.73 1.56 10.25 7.18
Acoustic 26.76 25.94 26.69 25.23
Ijcnn1 13.90 12.38 14.66 18.54
Seismic 20.68 19.82 18.97 45.62
Splice 22.79 21.30 22.50 39.11
OMNeT 30.64 26.42 31.08 37.56
al
fa
MNIST 14.34 8.79 16.76 17.00
Acoustic 39.94 36.87 40.25 42.23
Ijcnn1 32.02 29.01 23.96 35.08
Seismic 30.85 29.60 30.31 33.42
Splice 29.90 26.80 29.40 34.64
OMNeT 41.23 31.98 25.54 33.41
al
fa
-t
ilt
MNIST 17.13 6.64 16.76 17.00
Acoustic 43.87 40.72 43.78 43.03
Ijcnn1 32.60 27.05 26.00 36.47
Seismic 33.93 30.26 31.90 46.21
Splice 30.47 26.64 30.58 43.28
OMNeT 42.79 37.68 22.81 33.41
without a defense against random label flips varies from
dataset to dataset. We observe that it can retain near 1% error
rate on MNIST, a mere 5% increase in error rate on Acoustic
and a 6% increase on OMNeT when the flip rate is increased
up to 30%. On Ijcnn1, Seismic and Splice however there is a
16%, 10% and 18% increase in the error rates respectively. K-
LID-SVM outperforms the other defense mechanisms in all of
the datasets except for Seismic where LS-SVM has a 1.58%
lower average error rate. On the other datasets however, K-
LID-SVM has lower average error rates (up to 12%) than the
other two defenses. Figure 6 depicts how the error rates vary
on MNIST, Ijcnn1 and OMNeT when the training flip rate
increases from 0% to 30%.
Naive adversarial label flips: We consider farfirst and
nearest as naive attacks as the algorithms are relatively simpler
compared to alfa and alfa-tilt. Although farfirst is simple, it
can have a significant impact on an undefended SVM with
error rates increasing by 30% on MNIST, 13% on OMNeT,
29% on Acoustic, 48% on Ijcnn1, 27% on Seismic and 34%
on Splice when the flip rate is increased to 30%. In nearest, the
increase in error rates are 18% on MNIST, 13% on OMNeT,
3% on Acoustic, 8% on Ijcnn1, 1.4% on sesmic and 12%
on Splice. In farfirst, the K-LID-SVM outperforms the other
defenses in all scenarios except Ijcnn1 and OMNeT, where LS-
SVM has 7.4% and 5.9%lower average error rates respectively.
In nearest, LS-SVM outperforms K-LID-SVM on Seismic by
0.85% and LN-SVM outperforms K-LID-SVM on Acoustic
by 0.7%. In all the other datasets we observe that K-LID-
SVM outperforms the other defenses by large margins (up to
15% against farfirst and up to 25% against nearest). Figure
7 shows how the error rates vary on MNIST, Acoustic and
OMNeT when the training flip rate increases from 0% to 30%.
Sophisticated adversarial label flips: Carefully selected
adversarial label flips have a significant impact on the per-
formance of SVMs. Against alfa, the error rates go up by
28% on MNIST, 34% on OMNeT, 29% on Acoustic, 40%
on Ijcnn1, 24% on Seismic and 28% on Splice when the flip
rate is increased from 0% to 30%. Against alfa-tilt, the error
rate increases are 33% on MNIST, 35% on OMNeT, 35%
on Acoustic, 39% on Ijcnn1, 33% on Seismic and 27% on
Splice. Under alfa and alfa-tilt attacks, LS-SVM outperforms
K-LID-SVM on the Ijcnn1 and dataset with 5.05% and 1.05%
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Fig. 7: The average error rates of SVM, K-LID-SVM, LS-SVM and LN-SVM (µ = 0.15) against naive label flip attacks on
MNIST, Acoustic and OMNeT when the training flip rate increases from 0% to 30%.
lower error rates respectively. Similarly, LS-SVM has 1%
and 15% lower error rates on the OMNeT dataset under
the same attacks. On all other datasets, the K-LID-SVM can
significantly reduce the error rates compared to the other two
defenses against all attack strategies. We observe that, on
average, K-LID-SVM can achieve 1.3% to 10.5% lower error
rates compared to the undefended SVM, 1.4% to 16.7% lower
error rates compared to LN-SVM and up to 10.1% lower error
rates compared to LS-SVM. Figure 8 shows the impact of alfa
and alfa-tilt on three datasets.
5) Under Poisoning Attacks: We compare the performance
of K-LID-SVM against LS-SVM [7] and CURIE [28] under
poisoning attacks. The two algorithms use different approaches
to address the problem of learning under adversarial condi-
tions. Table III gives the error rate of each defense mechanism
averaged over all the poison rates considered (0% - 30%).
Similar to the random label flip attack, the performance of
the binary SVM without a defense against poisoning attacks
varies from dataset to dataset. On MNIST, we observe that
it can retain a near 1% error rate under all three attack
algorithms considered. On the other data sets, however, we
see a considerable impact on detection accuracy.
Under PA, the error rates increase by 22.3% on OMNeT,
3.7% on Acoustic, 10.5% on Ijcnn1, 7.2% on Seismic and
4.7% on Splice when the perturbation rate is increased from
0% to 30%. The LS-SVM outperforms K-LID-SVM on Ijcnn1
and OMNeT with 3.44% and 1.2% lower average error rates
respectively. On the other data sets, however, K-LID-SVM
outperforms the other defense algorithms by up to 2.9%.
Under RA, we see a 0.2% increase in error rate on MNIST,
0.9% on OMNeT, 14.3% on Acoustic, 10.3% on Ijcnn1, 5.4%
TABLE III: Average error rates across all the attack rates of
each defense algorithm against the three attacks considered.
The best results are indicated in bold font.
Dataset SVM K-LID-SVM LS-SVM CURIE
PA
MNIST 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.64
Acoustic 29.61 28.12 28.78 28.24
Ijcnn1 16.42 15.51 12.07 16.36
Seismic 22.52 21.23 22.11 22.33
Splice 20.94 18.65 19.16 21.53
OMNeT 30.38 29.47 28.29 30.44
R
A
MNIST 0.84 0.78 0.57 0.73
Acoustic 31.74 29.13 31.16 28.66
Ijcnn1 15.63 12.86 9.43 13.80
Seismic 24.77 18.24 18.61 20.14
Splice 20.39 17.16 18.80 20.91
OMNeT 18.20 18.89 19.32 18.86
C
G
MNIST 0.68 0.66 0.56 0.68
Acoustic 31.26 28.42 30.68 30.41
Ijcnn1 16.07 13.66 15.72 14.99
Seismic 23.43 18.08 19.24 20.49
Splice 19.76 16.09 17.72 18.88
OMNeT 18.02 18.70 17.36 18.90
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Fig. 8: The average error rates of SVM, K-LID-SVM, LS-SVM and LN-SVM (µ = 0.15) against sophisticated label flip
attacks on MNIST, Acoustic and OMNeT when the training flip rate increases from 0% to 30%.
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Fig. 9: The average error rates of SVM, K-LID-SVM and LS-SVM against poisoning attacks on three datasets when the attack
percentage increases from 0% to 30%.
on Seismic and 5.8% on Splice when the perturbation rate goes
from 0% to 30%. Again we see LS-SVM outperforming K-
LID-SVM on Ijcnn1 with a 3.4% lower average error rate. We
also observe CURIE having a 0.47% lower average error rate
on Acoustic. On the Seismic and Splice datasets, however,
K-LID-SVM outperforms the other defenses by up to 3.8%
lower error rates.
We observe that under CG, the K-LID-SVM can consis-
tently outperform LS-SVM and CURIE with lower average
error rates up to 2.8% on all the considered datasets except for
OMNeT where LS-SVM has a 1.3% lower average error rate.
Figure 9 shows the impact of PA and RA on Seismic, Acoustic
and OMNeT when the training perturbation rate increases from
0% to 30%.
C. Discussion
We observe that the adversarial attacks such as farfirst,
alfa and alfa-tilt increase the error rates of the tested learners
considerably compared to random label flips. This shows that
although SVMs may be able to handle label noise in some
scenarios by design, they are not immune to adversarial label
flip attacks and by selectively flipping labels, adversaries can
significantly increase the error rates. The nearest attack, where
the labels of data points that are nearest to the separating
hyperplane are flipped, has the least impact on the prediction
accuracy of learners across all the considered test cases. We
speculate that flipped labels near the hyperplane results in less
movement/rotation in the margin compared to label flips that
are farther away.
From the three poisoning attacks we have considered in this
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paper, PA [3] and CG [30] are unable to perform simultaneous
optimization of multi-point attacks (i.e., collectively perturb
data points such that there is a maximal increase in validation
error). Furthermore, PA [3] attempts to find a reasonably good
local maximum of the non-convex validation error surface,
which may result in sub optimal attacks. Therefore we see
in Table III that the impact of poisoning attacks on SVMs is
similar to that of random and nearest label flip attacks.
Although LS-SVM, LN-SVM and CURIE add some re-
sistance to SVMs against training time attacks, K-LID-SVM
can consistently reduce error rates across different attack
strategies and datasets. LN-SVM and LS-SVM try to address
the problem of learning under adversarial attacks by spreading
the influence on the decision boundary more evenly across all
samples (using heuristics), whereas in K-LID-SVM we make
samples that are suspected to be attacked contribute less. From
the extensive experiments conducted, we see that the novel K-
LID calculation we introduce has the potential to distinguish
attacked samples from benign samples and thereby subdue the
malicious actions of adversaries.
CURIE attempts to learn under adversarial conditions by
filtering out data points injected by the adversary using an
algorithm based on clustering. The authors claim that attacked
samples stand out from non-attack samples in (feature + label)
space. As filtering is a pre-processing step that happens before
training, CURIE can be used in conjunction with K-LID-SVM
to further improve the attack resistance.
A distributed SVM based learning solution allows for lower
communication overhead without significantly compromising
detection accuracy as shown in Section V-B1. Therefore it
is ideal to be used in the SDR based cognitive radio net-
work to detect malicious transmission sources. But the main
drawback of the distributed learning system is that it exposes
multiple entry points for attackers and an attack can propagate
through the network even if a single node is compromised. As
demonstrated by the experimental results, using K-LID-SVM
would facilitate secure distributed detection using SDRs while
benefiting from the reduced communication overhead provided
by the DSVM framework.
Although no significant differences in terms of running
times were observed during the above experiments, further re-
search could be conducted to determine the relative efficiency
of the different defense algorithms. While mini-batch sampling
is a tested method for improving the efficiency of K-LID-SVM
[32], [10], there is room for significant improvement through
parallelization.
In summary, the experiments demonstrate that (i) SVMs
are vulnerable to adversarial label flip attacks and poisoning
attacks, (ii) LID values in the input space may not have
sufficient distinguishing power when the data from the two
classes are not linearly separable (whereas K-LID does), (iii)
K-LID-SVM can withstand label flipping attacks as well as
poisoning attacks (iv) de-emphasizing the effect of suspected
samples gives better performance than methods that attempt to
make all samples contribute to the decision process (e.g., LS-
SVM and LN-SVM), (v) distributed detection using a DSVM
framework has less communication overhead compared to a
centralized learner under adversarial conditions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have addressed the challenge of increasing
the attack resistance of SVMs against adversarial training time
attacks. We observed that carefully crafted label flips and
perturbations can significantly degrade the classification per-
formance of SVMs. We introduced a novel LID approximation
(K-LID) that makes use of the kernel matrix to obtain the LID
values as well as three different label dependent variations of
K-LID that can be used in situations with label flips. Using
the K-LID, we proposed a weighted SVM (K-LID-SVM) and
showed by testing against different attacks on several real-
world datasets that it can be successfully utilized against
label flip attacks as well as poisoning attacks. While there
were some instances where LS-SVM, LN-SVM and CURIE
outperformed K-LID-SVM, we observed that K-LID-SVM can
achieve a higher level of stability across the different attacks
and datasets considered in this evaluation. We observed that
by using K-LID-SVM in a distributed manner, the learner
can significantly reduce the communication overhead without
sacrificing the classification accuracy. A further study could as-
sess the feasibility of integrating K-LID into attack algorithms
and evaluating the trade-off between the attack’s severity and
detectability.
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